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Abstract: The determinants of the value of the entrepreneurial competences 
and behaviour are examined. The study reveals that time is the link between 
marginal productivities of the capital assets and that of the human competences. 
The successful entrepreneur behaves in order to give marketability to skills, 
riding a cycle that transforms them into a corporate hallmark. We provide a 
detailed description of a methodology to measure the ‘competence value’ and 
to compare it against standard goodwill estimations. Results of empirical 
analysis over a sample made of more than 3,000 Italian companies show that 
the proposed Intato-T-ratio is a stronger estimator than the widely diffused 
Tobin-Q-ratio. Allocating investments according to the competence value can 
exploit immediately 51% of hidden values and allow higher growth rates 
during an entrepreneurial cycle lasting 13 years on average. Aborting 
competence value in credit allowances procedures will impact dramatically on 
SMEs after the adoption of Basel-3 agreements. 
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This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled ‘Competence 
value emersion: a key to sound practices in entrepreneurial finance. From ‘Q’ 
to ‘T’ ratios in the North-Eastern Italian experience’ presented at Academy of 
Entrepreneurial Finance, 2011 Annual Meeting, UCLA, Los Angeles (CA),  
23 September 2011. 
 
1 Introduction 
The full adoption of techniques based on the so-called ‘Basel-II agreement’ has 
dramatically changed the funding procedures used by financial intermediaries in credit 
allowances. As a consequence, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are severely hit by 
a size-specific credit crunch as a consequence of their higher credit risk highlighted by 
standard financial analysis procedures (Brav, 2009). Entrepreneurial challenges are hit 
even more, due to their higher concentration of investment in intangible assets, growth 
opportunities and, most of all, skills embedded in their ‘human capital’ (Kerins et al., 
2004). Both debt and equity capitals divert from entrepreneurial finance transactions for 
their low return-to-risk ratios, mainly due to excess risk, at least as it is perceived through 
the investors’ risk aversion level. This financial problem is direct consequence of value 
concept: the best practices in value measurement are focused on capital assets instead of 
human competences. In fact, to estimate the latters you should require a model to detect 
the financial contribution of human behaviour. 
Despite the Basel regulating framework aimed to provide protection for the invested 
capitals by reducing risk, its true final achievement was to reduce the amount of credit 
flows. This is why the announcement of Basel-III standards is often depicted as the  
‘final countdown’ to the end of financial support to entrepreneurial finance. No one is 
able to determine, with a certain authority, if the above depicted financial shortage is 
mainly a consequence of the methodologies adopted in the financial industry (i.e., 
techniques of financial analysis), or that of the concept of entrepreneurial business 
valuation (i.e., to the value-assessment practices). At present, it must be recognised that 
neither the professionals nor the academics have found and undisputable answer to this 
tricky trade-off. However, both tend to blame each other for the failure to solve the entire 
puzzle (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Clearly, the measurement of the competence value is the core of the financial puzzle 
made of jointly lack of enough funds and sound methodologies. This paper proposes a 
unique model which enables both practitioners and theoreticians to value human 
competence at methodological and conceptual levels. 
On the methodology-side of the trade-off, the best practice in financial analysis 
demonstrates a kind of schizophrenia. It recognises the importance of the use of market 
values in the financial analysis. However, the real application made by the financial 
analysts suggests to use book values criteria especially for unlisted corporations. The 
need to strike a balance between analysis carried out on ‘book values’ and those referring  
to ‘market values’ remains the most difficult quest to tackle. The contribution of  
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knowledge they both offer is clear, but reconciling the results emerging from the two 
approaches to offer appropriate solutions to businessmen is extremely difficult. 
On the conceptual-side of the trade-off, on the other hand, real entrepreneurial finance 
usually do not detect market values due to a lack of affordable pairing groups in value 
benchmarking. This is because corporate finance theory requires the use of value 
estimation approaches based on standard/neo-classic financial models. The neo-classical 
financial model has a clear ‘bug’ for small businesses financial analysis since it misses 
non-emerged values due to market incompleteness (i.e., they are aborting 
entrepreneurship, being incomparable). 
Consequently, a loop triggers: ‘no measurement’ means ‘no assessment’, which 
means ‘no business decision/behaviour’, which means ‘no investment’, which means ‘no 
market value’ which, finally, means ‘no measurement’ opportunities (Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2006). Our research question is: can we conceive a competence value 
framework to avoid the loop and to increase trust over Basel tools? 
In the Italian case, the financial puzzle seems to be more complicated due to  
the typical structure of businesses. Small-sized companies, strong ownership control, 
under-capitalisation and lack of transparency in financial statements are all elements 
making the investigation more complex to carry out. The adopted practices use very 
different approaches to solve the information asymmetry that generates the above 
mentioned credit rationing, particularly constraining in the Italian case. This seems to be 
a reliable approach based on the best practices and regulations in use in the financial 
world. However, it does not allow us to explain the above average performance of several 
small business districts (e.g., the Venetian-North-Eastern area) and their long term 
persistence. Moreover, it cannot explain why the good performance is concentrated in 
rationed companies while bad debts continue to increase in balance sheets of Italian 
banks. Finally, as clearly detected by Kilby (1971), such an approach in standard 
financial practice clearly shows its limits in terms of growth opportunities even today, as 
is shown by macro-data on business development in Italy. 
But the complexity generated by anomalies and asymmetries of the Italian case can 
be an exceptional work out to develop alternative approaches to entrepreneurship. These 
different approaches support sound practices in entrepreneurial finance transactions. The 
performance persistence of the Italian SMEs supports the adoption of a conceptual 
scheme where the strength of the economic activity is evidenced by the creation and 
emergence of what we call the competence value: a theme which is as fascinating as it is 
dangerous. Practical difficulties of transforming the competence value into market value 
reveals the drivers to sound entrepreneurial finance practices. 
The paper is organised in the following fashion. Section 2 introduces a conceptual 
framework of entrepreneurial economics which is suggested to support the gaps between 
fair and market values. Section 3 explores the opportunities of an incomplete market 
approach to use contingent-claim methods to proxy the competence-value. Section 4 
presents the basics of the Intato-method for competence value proxy on a sample of 
SMEs in the Treviso’s District. Section 5 concludes along with some possible further 
research developments. 
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2 Skill contributions to entrepreneurial business models 
Our idea is to think about skills as a productive factor contributing to business economics 
(Baumol, 1968). In the entrepreneurial businesses, skills contribution to corporate 
economics is the key factor, typically supplied by the entrepreneur. Skills productivity is 
strongly joined to that of the capital used by the company (Baumol, 1993) while its level 
depends on the true behaviour of the entrepreneur inside the firm. Accordingly, the 
entrepreneur involved in SMEs is usually also a very important member of the equity 
owners. When this is the case, the specific conjunction of capital and skills is depicted 
even in the legal aspects of the firm’s life (Salim, 2005). This is why “an important 
junction as entrepreneurs’ and investors’ decision do not always seem to follow 
traditional economic models” (Strom, foreword in Yazdipour, 2011) and even why 
entrepreneurial finance is related to behavioural finance. 
The joint productivity of invested capital and skills is the key problem for a sound 
value measurement of entrepreneurial economics (Zahra, 1991). The final output (i.e., 
business return) is unique while inputs can be all identifiable in their nature, even if not 
always in their dimension. This is why it is very difficult to split the returns according to 
the marginal contributions of the different inputs and why the markets (both capital  
and job) remain incomplete. A neoclassical economic approach to entrepreneurial 
business is unfit for obvious reasons. Ever since the abolition of slavery, it has been 
possible to dissociate capital from human beings but not their competences. Thus,  
when entrepreneurs sell their own company shares, they are actually transferring the 
capital-only component of their legal title, while skills remain anyway their own 
property. That is why the price of shares can divert from (i.e., be lower than) their value 
in case of permanence of the entrepreneur inside the firm. In this second scenario the 
excess returns are still supported by the contribution of the entrepreneur’s competences, 
while in post-selling scenarios no skill-contributions will exist. Skills have value per se, 
but do not have price until they are embedded inside the corporate organisation. True 
transfer of skills into assets and firms depends on true behaviour of the entrepreneur 
during the corporate life-cycle. The tricky topic, here, is the relation between corporate 
performance and overconfidence: a typical quest of applied behavioural (corporate) 
finance. Having a sound method to assess the value of skills could help investors to detect 
whether they are paying for the real or for the perceived competences in order to 
normalise their risk aversions. 
Consolidated behavioural finance research confirms that overconfidence is a typical 
bias of the entrepreneurs (Busenitz, 1999; Cooper et al., 1988). Our idea is that this is  
due to a specific characteristic of the entrepreneurial expertise: its convertibility from  
an individual feature to a firm hallmark according to the true behaviour of the 
entrepreneur. This triggers a process of (intangible) corporate wealth capitalisation, since 
the know-how of the entrepreneurial skills can be spread more easily through learning 
experience than through market transactions (Rullani, 2004).This knowledge-economics 
approach suggests several applicable distinctions from the neoclassical framework, as: 
1 time is no more a present value computation input but the only affordable (but 
redundant) means to transmit knowledge 
2 business organisation is no longer a mere nexus-of-contracts but a social framework 
that allows individual behaviour to embed personal skills into corporate structures 
(including technology). 
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Once the process of skill transfer to the organisation has been completed, wealth 
generation at competitive rates of return is due to increased productivity of corporate 
capital brought (only) by the injection of human competence (i.e., corporate returns are 
no longer person-related and consequently marginal productivity separation puzzle is 
dissolved). At that moment, the corporate selling-price and the entrepreneur-contingent-
value will converge being both based on the same return-to-risk expectations. There is no 
longer any information risk (Allen and Gale, 1994) involved. During competence 
spreading period, the selling-price will grow up to the going-concern-value since 
competences are being ‘cloned’ from the entrepreneurial brain into the firm structure. 
The corporate return-to-risk ratio is already satisfying expectations but it is hit by 
idiosyncratic information risk (Mantovani, 2012) due to the marginal productivity 
conjunction. In these situations, markets become incomplete because value exists at fair 
concept but not in transaction prices. Contracts are even incomplete, increasing 
information asymmetries and risk-premia. 
We can also envisage a similar overconfidence puzzle in the typical managerial 
framework of the financial theory of the firm, due to very restrictive and unrealistic 
conditions for equilibrium (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Undertaking a widespread 
ownership of the corporation and separating ownership and control means typically to 
entrust competences in management staff. Even in this case, consolidated research in 
corporate behavioural finance suggests that some categories are more exposed to this 
phenomena, such as top-executives (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Ben-David et al., 2007; 
Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). The split of the increased wealth that is produced by 
managerial competences is negotiated between ownership and management through the 
agency contract that governs their relationships. Strong agency problem may arise, of 
course. There are two consequences: the value of property rates increases and the risks 
too. The acquisition of skills by paying wages lower than their real economic contribution 
increases the value of property rights in the equity capital, but even increases risks since 
business requires continuity of managerial competence supply and rear of skills. 
Conversely, when corporate ownership and control overlap, principal-agent problems can 
arise in case of transferability of property rights are transferred over to the company 
which contributes to lower the value of the firm. In this case the necessity of an agency 
contract between seller and buyer relates to the competence persistence after the deal is 
concluded (Williamson and Masten, 1999). Still here, overconfidence evidence may arise 
for other financial market agents such as analysts (Hilary and Menzly, 2006; Chen and 
Jiang, 2006) or experts (Griffin and Varey, 1996; Klayman et al., 1999) and relate to the 
assortment of these specific individuals around forecast-oriented, highly selective 
professions that call to a great level of risk-taking. Even in these cases, risk aversions get 
biased. The quest for an entrepreneurial business concept (Covin and Slevin, 1991) is 
clear, even according to a financial perspective: 
• assessing the value of the entrepreneurial competence is utmost complicated since 
skills and capital are jointed productive factors (drivers) of the entrepreneurial 
business 
• time required by the learning cycle inside the organisation can separate them. The 
process will be more efficient according to the true behaviour of the entrepreneur 
• massive agency problems may arise during the process of skill spread and value 
emersion, increasing the risk of the investment in the entrepreneurial challenge 
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• risk aversions can be biased by misperception and information risk while can be 
forced to divert from normal levels according to the peculiarities of the 
entrepreneurial business 
• the core measurement question is the identification of the marginal productivity of 
the inputs (including skills) while time is no more a simple element to compute 
present value. 
As is the case for the so-called ‘human capital’ (or even for ‘business expertise’), in 
entrepreneurial challenges we are facing a special form of intangible asset with economic 
profiles that are rooted inside the circuits where knowledge is produced and transferred 
inside the capital market. This is the competence value: by increasing the portability of 
entrepreneurial skills via the market (i.e., together with the indistinct capitals) the 
possibility of observing market prices that incorporate expertise value will increase. The 
emersion of competence value into market price, however, can be an extraordinary 
economic incentive to accumulate and cultivate entrepreneurial skills and flow money in 
entrepreneurial finance transactions. But this process requires time, entrepreneurial 
commitment and patient investors. 
Based on the most affordable evolutions in entrepreneurship studies (e.g., Baumol, 
1986) and the previous exposition, we propose an entrepreneurial business concept based 
on the transformation of competence value into market values using time and the 
entrepreneur’s behaviour to implement efficient learning and organisation processes. 
The (competence) value creation is based on skills: no skills means no value. 
However, such skills do not mean market value: no active behaviour to spread knowledge 
into the firm prevents market value existence. A further theoretical concept is then 
required in our model to complete the skills-to-value connection: the value-emersion, i.e., 
the evolution of untradeable (i.e., very person-connected) potential value into the market 
price of the business (i.e., very capital-connected). Value emersion firstly requires skills 
tillage to transform them into competence to be further pullulated into the corporation. 
Accordingly, a three stages entrepreneurial-cycle can be observed: 
1 the entrepreneurial seed, where grafted skills are cultivated to be transformed into 
competence which requires capital investments (this is the competence-value 
creation phase) 
2 the entrepreneurial pullulating, where higher performances of firm investments 
emerge, although they are still depending on the entrepreneur agency to the 
organisation (i.e., the competence value is created but it is not fully sunk back into 
the firm) 
3 the entrepreneurial completing, where competence budding gets complete and the 
corporation benefits from fully embedded knowledge (competence emerges into 
market values). 
The entrepreneurial cycle cannot be interpreted correctly when adopting the standard 
concepts of management. Hisrich and Kearney correctly explain: “management is the 
transformation of inputs into outputs through conceptual, human and technical skills” 
while “an entrepreneur is future oriented, seeking opportunities and identifying 
innovations to fill opportunities” [Hisrich and Kearney, (2012), p.5] As John Stuart Mill 
suggested since 1848, the key difference between management and entrepreneurship is 
the bearing of risk. In fact, return-to-risk profiles are very specific for each of the three 
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stages and, consequently, the entire cycle cannot be fully interpreted through standard 
financial conceptual frameworks. In corporate finance, the value creation process is 
typically related to the emersion of a ‘per se’ goodwill of the assets. On the other hand, in 
entrepreneurial finance such a process is filtered by (i.e., related to) the actual behaviour 
of the entrepreneur who “assume the major risks in terms of equity, time and career 
commitments by providing value for a product of service” [Hisrich and Kearney, (2012), 
p.11]. Entrepreneurial finance is based on a behavioural risk model that clearly separates 
the treatment of ‘resident risk’ from that of ‘behavioural risks’ (Yazdipour, 2011): 
indeed, an ante-litteram perspective theory. Still Hisrisch and Kearney help us to better 
distinguish the two approaches as follows: 
“To an economist, an entrepreneur is one who brings resources, labour, vision, 
materials and other assets into combination that increase product or service 
value and introduce and implement change, innovation and a new order. To a 
psychologist, such a person is typically driven by certain forces – the need to 
attain something, to experiment, to accomplish or perhaps to escape authority.” 
[Hisrich and Kearney, (2012), still on p.11]. 
Comparing the dynamics of productivity that determines the returns and the risks of the 
entrepreneurial challenge over the entire cycle with that of the standard competitive 
company might be useful to detect the differences between the two approaches  
and distinguish between competence-driven and goodwill-driven value creation 
processes. Figure 1 helps to understand: the red-line depicts productivity of a competitive 
(i.e., goodwill generating) corporation, while the blue-line reports the case of a 
competence-driven one; both are compared with the expected return from an indistinct 
capital, the green-line (i.e., the cost of capital). 
Figure 1 The dynamics of observable business productivity (see online version for colours) 
tempo
produttività %
RETURN FROM
COMPETITIVE
BENCHMARK (wacc)
RETURN FROM
COMPETENCE
VALUE
Time
prod c ity
 
E-seed 
E-pullulating 
E-completing 
 
In the e-seed phase, entrepreneurial returns seem lower than the expected ones, while 
risks are higher than supposed. But this can be a misperception: flows from firms are low 
because of compensation between good margins and yearly budgets to be spent by the 
entrepreneur for skills transformation into competence. Such investment cannot be 
accounted for, at least according to standard accounting principles. It seems to be more 
likely a sunk cost, decided by the true behaviour of the entrepreneur who is accumulating 
the competence. This contributes to misperception. Corporate value is (apparently) very 
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low because current return gaps are perceived to be persistent, without any possible 
control over their recovery in the next phases. The typical short-termism that affects the 
financial system may inflate the misperception. It can be justified by the objective 
difficulties in detecting the true efficacy of the process of skills tillage that is carried on. 
This explains why business angels with competences similar to those of the entrepreneur 
are the key corporate investors for these phase. They contribute to the process more than 
they do to the financial needs. 
In the e-pullulating phase, the competitive advantage due to the accumulated 
competences emerges through a gross margin increase while sunk costs due to 
competence administration are reduced. This contributes to reduce (apparently) corporate 
risk due to the use of unfairly-paid-competences: in fact, a sound entrepreneurial 
behaviour leave the over profits into the company. In this second phase of the 
entrepreneurial cycle, corporate value increases along with the increase of financial 
flows, but a gap between potential (fair) value and market value still exists due to huge 
percentage of ‘behavioural risk’ (Yazdipour, 2011) embedded into corporate flows. Still, 
the higher fair value is more related to the person of the entrepreneur than not to the 
efficiency of the corporate nexus. 
In the e-completing phase, the competitive advantage is fully acquired by the 
corporate nexus becoming more and more independent from the entrepreneur’s 
behaviour. The corporate performance is strongly higher than the benchmark and gaps 
between potential and market values are reduced via goodwill values emersion, since 
cash flows are strongly higher than the most performer competitor. At this stage the 
entrepreneur may prefer to move into further E-seed phases so that governance related 
choices can be required. An agency problem emerges: who is entitled to acquire the 
higher value, i.e., how the value is to be shared between the entrepreneur and the 
corporate stakeholders? A great agency trouble, very difficult to solve. 
Even if return-to-risk profiles in the three stages are very specific, valuation should 
refer to the three as a whole since the persistency of the entrepreneurial contribution is 
the common root. The value that gets visible during the last phase was existing even in 
the seed but was invisible, because of difficulties in detecting (perceiving) the persistency 
of competence contribution to the corporate performance over the entire cycle. No 
persistency means no value emersion (Zahra and Covin, 1995): persistency is then the 
key factor to measure the competence value, because this is the essence of the 
entrepreneurial art. 
Accordingly to the above depicted model, we can understand how easily the 
competence value can be confused with the value of goodwill, concluding that ‘no 
goodwill means no competence’. But this is due to the misperceptions of the true roots of 
the return-to-risk paths of the entrepreneurial business: the typical mistake one can 
observe in the use of Basel-related tools, thus arising an information risk that reduces 
capital allowances to SMEs. In fact, goodwill is a negotiable value because it assumes 
that the purchaser is able to fully appropriate the benefits that might derive from 
investing, i.e., it is already instilled in the organisation through competitiveness. 
Competence value is instead an un-negotiable value, a starting point which leads to a 
potential state, because it is not entirely feasible without completing the cycle of 
knowledge-transfer to the company structure and without the entrepreneurial behaviour. 
In entrepreneurial business cycles, goodwill is not a ‘per-se’ asset, but the final evidence 
of the competence persistency inside the corporate nexus during the entire cycle. The 
requirement of persistency needs specific entrepreneurial finance tools to support the 
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transformation process of the competence value into goodwill. Long term financial tools 
are required in order to contribute to control the agency profile of the entrepreneurial 
behaviour and to have a correct perception of the resident risks vs. the behavioural ones. 
Maybe, structured debt-funding with legal entrepreneurship commitment (covenants) 
provides good support. Full shareholders performance will get only later, in the third 
stage. This leads to discuss entrepreneurship form a financial point of view. 
3 The entrepreneurial value in incomplete financial markets contexts 
Although it may seem like a seemingly simple question of semantics, value and price of 
capital are not synonymous. Adopting an incomplete financial markets approach is 
exactly the starting point for the entrepreneurial value measurement challenge. 
Price is the value as defined by the markets. It is, by its nature, objective, expressing 
the yardstick that the financial market uses to evaluate the current monetary equivalent of 
future economic benefits to obtain by the use of capital. The present value is the 
calculation methodology that allows us to understand the mechanism by which the 
financial market defines the above equivalence. Time and risk contribute to the 
determination of an annual rate of equivalence (i.e., the opportunity cost of capital), 
whose practical use is dependent upon the duration of the time horizon of a specific flow 
of wealth (discount factor). For the later purposes of this paper, consider the functionality 
of the time in the present value calculation as being well defined, contributing to a very 
small source of uncertainty, both in determining the cost of capital (Copeland et al., 
1995) and in the calculation of the discount factor. Neo-classical finance solves time 
uncertainty either by the adoption of instantaneous-time models (such as the standard 
CAPM) or by the adoption of continuous-time models (such as the Merton’s model). 
Both approaches aim to determine the relationship between risk and time (Merton, 1990) 
through the identification of a market portfolio (Tobin, 1958) to which all investors refer, 
regardless of their utility function. In this context, therefore, financial markets and 
intermediaries become perfect transformers of maturities and risks through their 
monetary certainty equivalent: the prices of capital. Having solved the maturity and risk 
puzzle, the market price is ‘the value’. The market quality must refer only to frictionless 
situations, i.e., information, transaction costs, taxes, etc. do not have to impact on price 
determination. The better the functionality (efficiency) of the market, the greater the 
information embedded in prices so that they become more reliable. 
Why have a value (i.e., a potential market price) other than market price in financial 
theory? Basically for two reasons: 
1 to correct market failures 
2 to outline subjective expectations on the set ‘economic benefits vs. risks-to-time 
twins’ (Arrow, 1971; Debreu, 1959). 
The scholarly attention has usually more focused on the former because un-equilibrated 
markets are noises. While ignoring the second, we miss sound models to explain what 
happens in the true world as the (sound) behavioural finance would try to do (Yazdipour, 
2011). Moreover, we miss the idea that some forms of capital could be untradeable. This 
may happen because of the difficulties in detecting the complex mechanisms of flows 
generation, perhaps even for objective difficulties of calculation (information risk bias). 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   392 G.M. Mantovani    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
In reality, however, the different perception of the true set (time-benefits-risks) strives to 
articulate a specific time equivalence of the flows of funds based on a subjective set of 
expectations and risk tolerances both strongly jointed: that is the value of capital. The 
greater the difference between value and price of capital, the more likely it is the 
activation of negotiations (Rubinstein, 1975), thus ensuring the survival of the market 
(Latham, 1985). Consequently, the value-to-price gap is an economic incentive to 
complete the markets, but do not deny the existence of market equilibrium. Contrarian to 
normal acknowledge, the relationship between value and price not only indicates the 
degree of market inefficiency, but also detects the distance between the set of subjective 
expectations of those who deliver value and the more general one embedded in the 
market prices. The more this happens, the greater the possibility that uncertainty can be 
resolved out of the identification of the unique market portfolio. The maturity 
transformation capability of the financial system is bugged and the markets remain 
incomplete. 
The efficiency of the financial markets is therefore no guarantee of convergence 
between value and price. It is only a precondition for transactions to make it easier to 
facilitate the convergence. In order for price and value to match instantly, market 
efficiency is the condition that facilitates the possible overlap of the time-benefit-risk set 
relative to the expectations of potential sellers and buyers. However, this condition is 
necessary (not sufficient) because an additional factor contributes to the gap between 
value and price: the inability (or failure) of the financial market to set a price for certain 
capital goods. This is the case when financial markets are defined as incomplete (Allen 
and Gale, 1994). Their operating mechanisms are not distorted by friction functional, 
such as transaction costs, which reduce the degree of efficiency. On the contrary, in 
incomplete financial markets there is a situation in which there is a set of (efficient) 
prices relating to a fraction only of capital goods, which are the negotiable-assets. This 
has effects even on the value (not price) of un-negotiable-assets through changes in the 
cost-effectiveness of the use non-tradable capital through its marginal productivity 
(Mantovani, 1998). This is particularly true in cases when un-negotiable-capital is  
bound by ties of joint productivity with the tradable one: entrepreneurial finance is a 
typical case. Once again, the cost-effectiveness of the use of the mix of negotiable and 
un-negotiable capital (i.e., their joint productivity) introduces convenience in negotiating 
the capital that is now non-negotiable within the financial markets. 
3.1 Corporate finance vs. entrepreneurial finance 
A typical example of low-negotiable asset is represented by all those intangibles that 
deploy their productivity along with an indistinct capital that is more easily financed in 
the market. If productivity of the indistinct capital is closely related to the intangible 
assets owned by the company (as in the case of the entrepreneur’s know-how of many 
SMEs), the market price of the capital cannot incorporate any indistinct surplus (i.e., 
goodwill). In this case, the sale of the indistinct capital can destroy the connections of 
joint use of this capital with the intangibles and the right of its economic exploitation. 
The value exists but it struggles to be embedded in the negotiated price of the indistinct 
capital. In these cases, the ratio of ‘specific-to-standard’ expected cash flows is a driver 
more than any other to explain the difference between perceived values and market prices 
(Massari and Zanetti, 2004). In fact, the former assumes the continuity of the link, while 
the latter supposes its dissolution. In these cases, the seller of the capital will often have 
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the feeling of having ‘sold out’ the company because the value it receives incorporates 
productivity that is not replicable by the buyer. At the same time, in the event that the 
intangibles had inextricably links with the corporate structure, the transfer of contingent 
rights on capital would also involve the transfer of exploitation rights of the future 
productivity of intangible assets and the relationship between value and price would 
accordingly be closer. This tends to complete financial markets because of the 
negotiation of a bundle that integrates indistinct intangible assets into capital. However, 
the different perspectives of exploitation of intangible assets from potential buyers in 
competition with each other could again make it otherwise attractive to buy them. This 
would lead to the incorporation in the prices of the value of the future exploitation of 
intangible assets and thus make prices ‘off market’ for certain buyers and ‘extremely 
favourable’ to others. The completion of the market could then increase its efficiency by 
enabling the negotiability of intangible assets separately from the indistinct capital. 
Efficiency would be further enhanced by allocating capital through transferability of only 
one part of the capital with lower transaction costs (because the transaction would be no 
longer anchored to the afferent indistinct capital), expanding the audience of potential 
buyers.  
The corporate goodwill is a clear case of negotiable intangible asset, while 
competence value is typically a low/un-negotiable intangible asset. The possibility of 
misperceptions that lead to confuse each other is very high. The critical issue emerges 
especially considering the fact that they both directly affect expectations regarding the 
cash flow, time horizons, perceived risks, degrees of risk aversion and, therefore, risk 
premia: all the economic components of the gap between price and value, i.e., the market 
incompleteness. Cash flow projection is more difficult in the case of competence value 
estimation due to the longer time horizon required and for the functionality of time as 
value-driver of the entrepreneurial success: estimate bias can increase dramatically along 
with the information-risk, particularly at corporate level and the specific risk-premium 
that it embeds into the cost of capital (Mantovani, 2012). The more the financial markets 
are incomplete, the more the misperception is probable while confusing goodwill and 
competence value shorten, indeed, the time horizon of the analysis. If you think carefully 
about standard financial analysis practices in cash flow estimation, they usually adopt 
formulas based on short-term figures. Short-term competitive condition is supposed to be 
the ultimate value driver (Chen and Steiner, 2000). This generates even more information 
bias and misperception. 
An accurate return-to-risk analysis, only, could help to identify correctly the nature of 
values (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). If you think carefully about the features of the 
contribution of time to the entrepreneurial business model, particularly into the process of 
joint production of capital and skills (Orser et al., 2007), you can identify specific 
imprints of the four variables acting as common matrix for the dynamics of competence 
value and goodwill (i.e., cash, time, payoff-risk and risk aversion/premium). This 
analysis is useful to avoid the information risk bias (Reuber and Fischer, 1999). 
Goodwill is a capital asset whose economic paradigm is based on the input-output 
logic, similar to many other factors of production. The input of this process is the 
competitiveness. The output is expressed by returns-to-risk ratio of the invested capital 
higher than the cost of capital. Similar to the case for any other productive factor, the 
input destruction through a consumption process is the necessary condition for the 
production of the output itself (Rullani, 2004). Time is the technical condition that allows 
the input-output process to happen: this is why we compute lower present values; the 
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longer is the time horizon. As per any other commodity, however, it is possible to 
reconstruct the input providing maintenance or replacement investments which are 
capable of impacting the process of depreciation (i.e., capital consumption). Unlike 
physical capital goods in which the technical component contributes significantly to the 
amortisation of business, in the case of goodwill the opposite may happen. This is 
because the competition (the input) also significantly depends on the dynamic economic 
environment surrounding the company. Thus, the drivers of the depreciation of goodwill 
are consistent with what happens in the normal world of business, this being the essence 
of the managerial work. The proof lies in the fact that the new accounting standards state 
that managers are responsible for the goodwill value adjustment on the basis of the 
impairment test (Bini and Guatri, 2003) or as a result of joint verification of the impacts 
of the decisions of businesses and environmental dynamics on the value of goodwill. 
However, while this vision is closer to those adopted into financial markets, it maintains 
the principle of the consumption of the input for the realisation of output. That is why 
goodwill is usually considered in financial analysis ratio as a support for funding 
decisions.  
Competence value, on the other hand, is a corporate feature based on a process that 
uses the initial entrepreneurial knowledge as input (e.g., the ability to perform a particular 
production activity) to transform it into competence in order to spread it into the 
corporate nexus. Very differently from the goodwill case, when the process is completed 
the input is not destroyed, but is cloned during the accumulation process. Consequently, 
the initial knowledge must follow the release of other knowledge. The time is no longer 
merely a technical element: it is one of the key inputs. In fact, different productivities of 
inputs are to be given the necessary time to develop a cross-fertilisation between 
knowledge input and that which occurs independently in the structure. In the phase in 
which knowledge is accumulated, there is ‘loss of time’ as a factor of production, 
creating a major problem of perception and agency. There is, therefore, no improvement 
of the immediate performance economic (because you have to wait for the completion of 
the accumulation process) thus leaving space for phenomena of opportunism that would 
consume resources that would otherwise be used. In contrast, the more developed the 
process of accumulation is, the more the complexity of the ‘capital + skills’ overall 
productivity will grow rapidly and increase economic performance, without affecting the 
cognitive capital. 
Entrepreneurial finance transaction success may be influenced by the completion 
grade of the financial market and its affection to the marginal productivity of capital, 
thereby by altering the forms of cost-effectiveness of the use of the entrepreneurial value. 
In fact, in incomplete financial markets, potential externalities relate to: 
1 the opportunity to get assets with a higher value-to-price ratio and therefore allowing 
to gain a higher-profit 
2 the dissolution of an asset price when its negotiation means to cut the link between 
its productivity of the one of another untradeable-asset left to the seller. 
In other words: case 1 refers to financial investors that may easily bargain undue value 
from entrepreneurs who require completing the skills spreading cycle; case 2 takes place 
in share selling by very skilled entrepreneurs before the spreading cycle to complete. In 
both cases, it is a governance puzzle. The ability to contribute to the completion of the  
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market, thereby increasing the overall economic benefit and creating space for a specific 
economic reward is an incredible challenge to entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial 
finance professionals. We suggest considering any entrepreneurial finance deal as an 
attempt to search a financial solution to fund the entrepreneurial business while 
completing the financial market. This is, indeed, the only way to transform personal skills 
into corporate competitiveness and let competence value emerge into market price. The 
financial solution must even prevent any agency conflict inside the corporation, while 
adapting to the specific investor’s risk aversion. 
3.2 Debt and equity capital in entrepreneurial finance 
The primary impact of the opportunity given by market incompleteness is over the use of 
debt in the capital structure of entrepreneurial businesses. The neo-classical financial 
theory gives us a model suggesting that financial leverage can be pushed to levels where 
the marginal positive contribution of the tax shield induced by debt is equal to the 
negative impacts led by agency costs and bankruptcy (Robichek and Myers, 1965). In 
this theoretical context, however, the reference data are the book values of the assets as 
represented in financial statements, which are set equal to market values according to the 
hypothesis (not always so explicit)of market completeness. But if financial markets are 
incomplete, (book) values and prices differ a lot, making the application of the classical 
approach very difficult (Mantovani, 2003). Moreover, the presence of significant agency 
costs resulting from the frozen conflicts for the appropriation of economic benefits from 
the use of skills make it even more difficult to apply. In these cases you need to abandon 
the classical models of finance to accommodate contingent claim approaches to corporate 
finance, which are based on the more general state-preference concept framework 
(Arrow, 1971; Debreu, 1959). On this basis, the theoretical distinction between debt and 
equity capital is fully outdated as it is based on the quantity only of the (indistinct) risk to 
be covered by the lender. Contingent (and entrepreneurial) finance must instead be based 
on loan agreements which aim to design suitable shaped return-to-risk opportunities both 
in terms of quality and quantity. Accordingly, the design of debt contracts helps to solve 
the agency puzzle in entrepreneurship (i.e., value emersion) and to match the corporate 
need with the specific investor’s risk tolerance in terms of: duration, clauses, covenants to 
specific types of performance variables, formulas to guarantee non-property rights, etc. 
From a legal point of view, this is still debt capital (Diamond, 1991) but from an 
economic point of view it is not. It is primarily structured-capital since its value does not 
depends only on the assets price but it is even contingent to the ability to adapt its flows 
to the productive conditions of the business. This is the only way to access point-to-point 
financial transactions which is otherwise not achievable. It is then a settled-capital not 
only because it is provided through a financial intermediation, but since it requires the 
intelligence of a third party (i.e., not necessarily a bank) in the interpretation of the main 
drivers of the production cycle in order to design or compose the tools that best suit to the 
needs to be covered. Finally, it is a patient capital because: 
1 is based on a variable time horizon of the investment cycles 
2 requires an investor’s risk aversion consistent with a business risk that cannot always 
be replicated in the market, neither being part of the systematic or diversifiable risk. 
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In the first case, it would otherwise be replicated and the market would be complete. In 
the second, you must abdicate the signing of contracts instead of putting together a 
diversified portfolio. 
We will refer to this meta-debt funding as the ‘capital-quota’ (Mantovani, 1998)  
of the entrepreneurial finance deal. It is a monetary capital that becomes available  
to the entrepreneurial business in a contingent financing transaction (Nevitt, 1988). 
Remuneration is mainly based on co-participation in the results of a specific undertaken 
action. The value of the capital-quota depends on the contribution that the funding brings 
in the accumulation of asset values or on the contribution it makes to the productivity of 
the productive factors funded through it. But in entrepreneurial financing transactions, 
even an ‘expertise-quota’ is required to allow coverage of financial requirements mainly 
to support cash outflows that transform skills into competitiveness, particularly in the 
first two steps of the entrepreneurial cycle. This funding will be still contingent, but to the 
competence value itself and its farming and emersion into the goodwill at maturity of the 
entrepreneurial cycle. 
The use of debt-styled contracts may help to have a legal framework that is more 
friendly for the resolution of agency problems involved in competence value emersion. In 
fact, it is more likely that the capital-quota of the transaction will tend to assume many of 
the characteristics of debt but it will also embed some of the equity capital due to the 
expertise-quota. Indeed, the debt-financing framework makes it possible to incentivise 
the contribution of entrepreneurial skills to corporate performance and it leaves to the 
entrepreneur the opportunity to acquire large portions of any excess-earnings until the 
expertise-quota of the financing fully completes the transformation of competence value 
into goodwill (i.e., it completes the market through the emersion of negotiable value). On 
the opposite side, the economic analogies with equity capital reduce the agency conflicts 
related to the reduction of the corporate solvency which could arise from the destruction 
of productivity conjunction of the productive factors. This similarity with the equity 
(venture) capital is granted with a fair return at the very end of the competence emersion 
cycle by the liquidation of an high share of emerged-value-of-the-skills (goodwill).  
Thus, the investor’s expectations of performance will be satisfied along with the 
asymmetry of the distribution of risks between the lender and the entrepreneur in the 
stages of skills farming. The provisions charged over the funded entrepreneur, such as 
resale share-capital constraints or other covenants (Unicredit Banca, 2004), will be the 
technical gateway to solve the legal puzzle. 
4 Measuring competence value through the T-ratio 
To carry on these financial deals in order to take advantage of both the entrepreneurial 
opportunities and the financial markets incompleteness, sound methodological tools are 
required to estimate the potential value of skills during the entire entrepreneurial cycle 
and to bypass the myopia that affects financial markets and intermediation. It is well 
known that relative changes of competitive return to cost of capital dynamics permits to 
compute the CAPM-beta, thus to price a fair risk premium. But this approach is not 
practically applicable to competence driven business, since returns emersion requires 
time to complete the cycles. Only standard competitive business can be valued according 
to a financial pairing process.  
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The market value of a typical competitive corporation can be computed as the present 
value of expected (i.e., volatile) cash returns. Supposing a steady state firm (this only to 
keep easier the exposition of the model), maths of price computation are reported in 
equation (1). 
( )E CFP
k
=  (1) 
Being: P, the market-value/price of the company; E(CF) the expected level of cash flows; 
‘k’ the cost of capital 
If the corporation is competitive, its book returns ‘r’ are expected to be above the ‘k’ 
level 
( )E CF rP BV
k k
= =  (2) 
Being furthermore: BV, the book value of assets; ‘r’ the corporate rate of return 
Their price-to-book value ratio reflects the r-to-k ratio for any given level of 
systematic risk. 
( )P E CF BV r r
BV BV k BV k k
= = =  (3) 
Notice that ‘r’ is a book return rate. 
Given a certain level of risk, the market value will be higher than book value (i.e., 
goodwill exists) if the corporate rate of return is higher than the cost of capital (i.e., 
profitability is deployed). The market value of goodwill is exposed in equation (4) still 
considering a steady business 
1r r kG P BV BV BV
k k
⎡ ⎤ −⎛ ⎞= − = − =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦  (4) 
Being furthermore: G, the market value of goodwill. 
Let us consider now the case of an entrepreneurial venture which has a similar 
competitive initiative of the previous company in addition to grafted skills. In the e-seed 
and e-pullulating phases, lower expected cash flows are generated until grafted 
competence is fully cultivated into the firm. Consequently, the lower value can be 
estimated according to equation [1bis]: 
[ ]
1
( ) ( )E CF E X r xW BV
k k
− −= =  (1bis) 
Being W the estimated (i.e., fair but not market) value of the entrepreneurial business; 
E(X) the expected yearly investment required for competence pullulating; ‘x’ is the ratio 
of E(X) to the book value of the company 
Should the e-seed perpetuate, the price-to-book value ratio would reflect the (r – x)-
to-k ratio. 
[ ]1 ( ) ( )E CF E XP W r x
BV BV BV k k
− −→ = =  (2bis) 
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If ‘x’ is positive, W1/BV will be lower than fair P/BV… apparently! In fact, if successful, 
the competence spreading into the corporation would generate higher return-to-risk after 
‘t’ years. In other words, the e-pullulating stage would begin and tends to complete the 
value. 
The missing value at time zero can be described as depicted in equation (1-ter): 
2
( ) ( )
1
p E X E C
kW
k
++=  (1-ter) 
Being ‘p’ the probability of entrepreneurial success; E(C) the over-cash flow due to 
competences now put at work; ‘t’ the required time-spreading of competences  
(e-pullulating phase duration). 
The missing price-to-book value at time zero will be: 
2
( )
(1 )t
p x c
kW
BV k
+⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦=  (2-ter) 
Being: ‘p’ the probability of entrepreneurial success; ‘c’ the excess return generated by 
competences at work (= E(C)/BV); ‘t’ the required time-spreading of competences  
(e-pullulating phase duration). 
The gap between the values of the competitive-only company (P) and the complete 
value of the skilled company (W1 + W2) depends on the relationships between ‘c’, ‘x’, ‘p’, 
‘k’ and ‘t’, the entire set of determinants of W2/BV. Equation (5) shows the conditions to 
have P = W1 + W2 
1
(1 ) (1 )t t
p pc x
k k
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦
 (5) 
If the entrepreneurial project is successful (e-completing stage occurs) W2 is transformed 
into market value, thus regenerating the missing value (including goodwill). We fix W2 as 
the competence value estimation. The un-emerged value due to e-cycles to complete. 
One can now catch better the difference between goodwill and competence value 
discussed above by comparing equation (1) with (1bis). Generally speaking, P ≥ W1. In 
fact, according to equation [4] we can conclude that 
1P BV G W BV− = ≥ −  (4bis) 
and the lemma that 
2G W≠  (6) 
Competence value is different from goodwill value indeed! The math conclusion clearly 
represents the very different economic concepts (i.e., contents and drivers) of G and W2. 
More important, one can argue how dramatically different the functionality of time in the 
competence value case is from the goodwill one discussed above: in the case of goodwill, 
time is an instrument for value measurement only (i.e., it is used to calculate a present 
value); in the case of competence value, time is even an underpin of the business success,  
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filtered by the probability ‘p’ (i.e., it is a must to complete the capital accumulation 
process). 
Based on previous equations, the analogies between the theory of incomplete 
financial markets and that of the entrepreneurial business mechanics are clearer. W2 is the 
present hidden value that could emerge from the entrepreneurial behaviour (i.e., the 
expertise-quota of funding), P0 (or W1, according to the level of market efficiency) is the 
current market value that could encourage investors to enter entrepreneurial finance 
ventures (i.e., capital-quota of funding). At time ‘t’ (i.e., when competence cultivation 
cycle is completed) Pt could be particularly high if the company truly enters the  
e-completing phase. 
Accordingly, an entrepreneurial finance life-cycle can be depicted as such: 
• In the EF-seed phase, the negotiable-capital (i.e., the capital-quota of financing 
supporting corporate investments) is required to subordinate returns, diverting them 
to investment into grafted skills transformation into competence value. Contingent 
rights over competence value (i.e., expertise-quota) are required to invest in the 
reduced-current-returns-business and control agency troubles arising from the 
entrepreneur. 
• In the EF-pullulating phase, the negotiable-capital is required to subordinate 
maturity to actual competence deployment into corporate organisation. After the  
e-seed phase, returns can be paid out but are now contingent to the entrepreneur 
persistence inside the firm. In case of her/his abandonment, the competence value 
would dissolve and generate severe capital loss to investors. That is why 
entrepreneurs are bind to specific covenants and other non-capital constraints. 
• In EF-completing phase, the negotiable-capital is required to subordinate tradability 
to market opportunities mainly due to market efficiency and return-to-risk is related 
to specific levels of risk aversion. 
Risk aversions (of both investors and entrepreneurs) are indeed the key financial factor in 
all three phases since they determine the true behaviour of the two economic agents 
(Ross, 2002; Gardenal, 2010).The unique role of time in competence spreading would 
already be sufficient itself to require specific levels of risk aversion in funding 
entrepreneurial activities. But in this case the risk-to-time relation is complicated by a 
state-contingent evolution of the life cycle (synthesised as ‘p’ in the model) that is 
dramatically linked to the actual behaviour of the entrepreneur itself. Consequently, the 
risk aversion level is affected by the quest of contendability of the economic value of 
competences, which is an agency problem, indeed. A state-preference approach can help 
us in value discovery of competence value which avoids complexities arising from risk 
aversion treatment. Just this intuition helps us to model persistence, the key factor of the 
entrepreneurial business. In fact, according to the above explained business model of 
entrepreneurship, we can track its life-cycle in a real-option approach (Schwartz and 
Trigeorgis, 2004) as follows. The entrepreneurial success can be interpreted as a real call 
option over W2 which has an expected maturity at time ‘t’ (fixed only ex-post, according 
to the actual duration of the e-pullulating phase). Being a European-style option (i.e., to 
be exercised at maturity only), such an option highlights these economics: 
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1 (P0 – W1) is the option premium to call W2. Payment is done during the EF-seed 
phase 
2 (W1 + W2) – P0 is the intrinsic value of the option when it enters in-the-money  
paying cash returns due to competences but still cannot be exercised being in the  
EF-pullulating phase 
3 (Pt – P0) is the true payoff of the option during the EF-completing phase. 
The model for pricing of such an option can be very complex, maybe useless in actual 
SME funding practices. A more exploitable method has to be found. Considering that 
such a model refers to un-negotiable capital (i.e., supporting decisions, but not market 
value of wealth), we can accept to use a proxy-valuation approach to estimate such a real 
option value. 
A huge help may come from Lintner’s approach to asset pricing (Lintner, 1965). Such 
a model is based on a bottom-up approach, i.e., it is not required to collect data from 
complete financial markets to discover investment values. Oversimplifying the original 
model, Linter suggests estimating values by discounting the certainty equivalent on a 
risk-free rate. Avoiding the risk-premium estimation in discounting rate, the model does 
not require a market portfolio benchmarking. Results from Linter’s model are consistent 
with Tobin’s two-fund-separation theorem for the risk aversion impact on the equilibrium 
of financial markets. Not only Lintner’s model does allow achieving the same results as 
other models but also allows the development of applicable methodologies even in 
incomplete markets. 
In his seminal work, Lintner demonstrates that: 
1 you can determine the value by discounting certainty equivalent of cash flows (CE) 
using the risk free rate (Rf) 
2 the result is exactly the fair price you can find with market models. So, we can 
spread out the following equation1: 
( )
f
E CF CEP
k R
= =  (1quater) 
Being, furthermore: CE, the certainty equivalent of E(CF), [CE < E(CF)]; ‘Rf’ the  
risk-free rate, [Rf < k]. 
The consequence is that: 
( )
fRCE
E CF k
=  (7) 
or 
( ) f
R
CE E CF
k
=  (7bis) 
All previous computation can be relativised to book-value and compared with  
equation (2) so that the following equation can be written: 
*
f
r P r
k BV R
= =  (8) 
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Furthermore: r* the book return rate based on CE (= CE/BV); ‘Rf’ the risk-free rate. 
The inner difference between the Lintner’s approach with those referring to complete 
markets (such as the CAPM) is at methodological level. This is a bottom-up approach 
that does not require to have already a market equilibrium to fix prices (i.e., no loops link 
the price discovery and the required market equilibrium, as the CAPM does obliging  
one to detect peer-groups in corporate valuation). The complexity of the estimation of 
risk-premium is substituted by that of the CE estimation. Our suggestion is that in 
incomplete markets Linter’s approach can reduce bias and the information risk, finally 
the perspective gap. This is because the bottom-up approach will concentrate the analysis 
at corporate level and avoid mistakes arising from extraction of market related indicators 
in incomplete contexts. 
We can usefully merge Lintner’s approach with the previous entrepreneurial business 
concept. According to Lintner’s approach, we know that both price-P and value-W are to 
be based on the same certainty equivalent; the further condition for market completion – 
P = W1 + W2 – let the following equation be true: 
[ ] [ ]2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 )
fRpCE E CF E X E X E C
k k
⎧ ⎫= − + +⎨ ⎬+⎩ ⎭
 (7ter) 
It is particularly important to point out that previous equation uses book data only to 
estimate values (i.e., it uses the same data normally adopted in widely used financial 
statement analysis). The previous equation can be written in terms relating to BV as 
follows: 
*
1 2
( ) ( )
(1 )
f
pr x x c
kW W r
BV k R
⎡ ⎤− + +⎢ ⎥++ ⎣ ⎦= =  (8bis) 
At industry level, the quantitative level of r* (i.e., the book-CE threshold level) can be 
estimated according to a shortfall approach (Leibowitz, 1995). The joint distribution of 
‘r’, ‘x’ and ‘c’ is then used to determine r*, given a confidence level to be estimated 
according to the two basics of entrepreneurial business success: ‘p’ and ‘t’. Thus, an 
estimation of competence value can be done through a bottom-up (i.e., corporate/industry 
level) estimation of r* as follows: 
* ( ) ir i SHF N σφ= − +  (9) 
Being: i – SHF the shortfall level of return at φ confidence level, σi the standard deviation 
of book return rate for ith investment, N(φ) is the standardised normal distribution figure, 
given a fixed confidence level. 
According to Lintner’s approach, however, value estimations through CE must reflect 
the average risk aversion of investors, which means that market shortfall computation 
should generate the same numeric result. The numeric result of equation (9) should be 
validated by comparing it to market conditions. A market level or ‘r*’ can be estimated 
using the distribution of market returns (i.e., ‘k’) according to the market evidence of risk 
aversion. Thus, a top-down confirmation of the competence value estimation can be made 
through market data as follows 
* ( ) mk m SHF N σφ= − +  (9-bis) 
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Being: m – SHF the shortfall at φ confidence level, σi the standard deviation of returns for 
the entire market, N(φ) is the standardised normal distribution figure, given the same 
fixed confidence level. 
In equilibrium r* = k*. In fact, according to the Lintner’s hypothesis, equation (10) 
should be true: 
;m SHF i SHF i φ− = − ∀ ∀  (10) 
Once you have a confirmed estimation of r*, you can validate W2 computation and  
verify the actual capability of the industry/company to override the k*-threshold in the 
time-horizon according to the confidence level, thus applying in practice equation (8bis) 
as indicator of persistency. Please notice that the use of confidence estimation for the 
shortfall level is consistent with the persistency required for competence value existence 
but also with the value-at-risk approach adopted inside Basel-related risk measurement 
systems. Fixing the shortfall confidence means to know the average risk aversion of the 
market. In the case of Basel risk measurements, the shortfall level is 1%, which means 
that they know the average risk aversion inside the markets… and that such a risk 
aversion will never change! According to Linter’s approach, instead, the risk aversion is 
not a determinant driver of the model since the resulting price is the same as the one of a 
two-fund separation theorem depicted by Tobin (1958). The estimation of a specific risk 
aversion is then useful to detect the policies of a specific investor or entrepreneur, but not 
the equilibrium as a whole. 
Supposing the book value overlaps the ‘reconstruction level’, we can use the  
price-to-book value ratio as a proxy of the Tobin’s Q-ratio at corporate level. In 
incomplete markets, Q-ratio misses W2 because it does not consider the value-to-price 
gap endogenous to the incompleteness. A parallel ratio between W2 and the book-value 
can be estimated subtracting the Q-ratio from a similar indicator estimated on the basis of 
the Lintner’s approach as we propose to amend. In honour of the entrepreneurial spirit of 
the person giving the name to the foundation that supports this research programme, we 
decided to call it Intato’s T-ratio. Accordingly, Q-ratio and T-ratio computations can be 
theoretically done by using the following formulas: 
1 iW r x rQ
BV k k
−= = =  (11) 
*
2
*
( )
(1 )t
p x c
W rkT
BV k k
++= =  (12) 
According to equation (8bis), Q + T = r*/Rf, than T estimation can be confirmed through 
equation (13). 
*
i
f
r rT
R k
∧ = −  (13) 
The estimation of T exposed in equation (12) can be done through T∧ in equation (13), 
which is the core of the ‘Teofilo Intato method’ for competence value measurement. 
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5 An empirical example of T-ratio computation  
In this section, we illustrate in practice the fundamentals that underlie the estimation of  
T-ratio to proxy the competence value. Results will be compared with those arising from 
a more standard analysis searching for Q-ratio. Both estimations are based on the above 
steady state approach, suffering a potential time-bias. As explained above, the application 
and computation of the Intato’s method is being developed at industry level2 as it 
emerges from a first application in a sample of companies based in the Treviso’s District 
(here further: TV), the very competitive manufacturing area surrounding Venice in the 
North-Eastern Italy. 
Before describing in detail the selected sample, it is appropriate to emphasise that the 
collection and selection of data, as well as part of the analysis and calculations were made 
using the AIDA database, published by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing, which 
can be accessed according to an agreement between the Corporation and Ca’ Foscari 
University. This database contains accounting information of the Italian companies that 
make publish their financial reports. The Italian Lawmakes mandatory this disclosure for 
legal entities bearing limited liabilities over their owners/shareholders. According to the 
proposed competence value emersion theory, the choice of legal entities to be included in 
our analysis was based on logic of continuity. In fact, in ex-post analysis we do require 
the selected companies to have going concern to detect the persistency3. That is why our 
selection includes only those companies that produce accessible financial reports from 
2005 to 2009 continuously.  
The resulting sample consists of 3,046 companies inside the TV-area, is depicted in  
Table 1. It includes both firms forced by the Italian law to prepare detailed financial 
reports (i.e., 26.94% of the sample) and companies with the opportunity to draw financial 
statements in the so called ‘abbreviated form’ (73.06% of the sample). Both kinds of 
reports include enough data to validate the competence value in an ex-post approach. 
Table 1 Sample composition by industry 
Industry (translation of the original 
Italian name) ATECO code SIC code # of corporations 
Agriculture and hunting services, 
forestry 
01; 02 0 63 
Food and drink 10; 11 20 115 
Manufacture of textiles 13; 14.3 22 61 
Manufacture of clothing, dyeing, 
tanning fur 
14.1; 14.2 23 49 
Manufacture of leather goods made 
of wood, cork, straw 
15 31 53 
Manufacture of wood, cork, straw 16 24 104 
Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 
17 26 35 
Publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media 
18; 58.1 27 32 
Manufacture of chemicals and 
artificial synthetic fibres and 
20; 21 28 35 
Source: Our processing over AIDA database contents 
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Table 1 Sample composition by industry (continued) 
Industry (translation of the original 
Italian name) ATECO code SIC code # of corporations 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products 
22 30 96 
Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral processing 
23 33.5 79 
Metallurgy – manufacture and 
processing of metal products except 
machinery and equipment 
24; 25 34 314 
Manufacture of computers and 
electronic and optical products, 
electrical appliances, etc. 
26 35.7; 36.7 24 
Manufacture of electrical and  
non-electric domestic appliances 
27 except 27.5 36.1; 36.2; 36.4; 
36.5; 36.6 
62 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment nec 
28; 27.5; 33.12 35 /35.7 192 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semitrailers 
29; 30 37 29 
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 
31 25 237 
Manufacture of furniture 32 39 38 
Other manufacturing 41; 42; 43 15; 16; 17 310 
Building societies 45 55 94 
Trade, maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
46 50; 51 483 
Commerce wholesale and 
commission trade, motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
47 53; 54; 56; 57; 
58; 59 
150 
Retail (excluding motor vehicles 
and motorcycles), repair of 
personal and household goods land 
transportation, pipeline transport, 
storage and auxiliary transport 
activities 
49; 52 40; 42; 47 80 
Hotels and restaurants activities 55; 56 70 27 
Computer and related activities 62; 63; 95.11 73.7 65 
Real estate 68 65 115 
Professional services 69; 70; 71; 73; 74 87 76 
Recreational cultural and sports 90; 91; 92; 93; 
59.1 
79; 83 28 
Treviso’s District as a total 3,046 
Source: Our processing over AIDA database contents 
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Data exposed in Table 1 depicts the industry distribution of the firms according to both 
the Italian standard classification (ATECO) and the SIC code. The number of companies 
included in ATECO groups is enough to compute affordable descriptive statistics of 
companies performance for any industry included in the TV-area. 
The basic statistics required as input to adopt the method are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 Beta, cost of capital (k), operating returns (ROI) and risks (std. deviation of ROI) 
Industry (translation of the original 
Italian name) Beta 
Cost of 
capital 
Average 
ROI 
Median 
ROI 
Standard 
deviation 
of ROI 
Agriculture and hunting services, 
forestry 
0.65 7.72% 3.38% 2.56% 9.81% 
Food and drink 0.50 6.37% 7.91% 7.23% 9.13% 
Manufacture of textiles 1.60 16.27% 6.72% 6.19% 13.62% 
Manufacture of clothing, dyeing, 
tanning fur 
1.33 13.84% 11.91% 9.60% 16.70% 
Manufacture of leather goods made 
of wood, cork, straw 
1.56 15.91% 8.87% 7.97% 11.78% 
Manufacture of wood, cork, straw 1.17 12.40% 6.63% 6.52% 10.39% 
Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 
1.02 11.05% 6.70% 6.86% 7.84% 
Publishing, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media 
1.01 10.96% 10.00% 9.39% 10.75% 
Manufacture of chemicals and 
artificial synthetic fibres and 
0.57 7.00% 10.97% 9.30% 11.20% 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products 
0.97 10.60% 8.67% 7.49% 11.57% 
Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral processing 
1.28 13.39% 6.86% 5.86% 9.66% 
Metallurgy – manufacture and 
processing of metal products except 
machinery and equipment 
0.96 10.51% 10.28% 9.13% 10.93% 
Manufacture of computers and 
electronic and optical products, 
electrical appliances, etc. 
1.31 13.66% 9.37% 9.08% 13.21% 
Manufacture of electrical and  
non-electric domestic appliances 
0.89 9.88% 8.40% 8.55% 16.80% 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment nec 
1.26 13.21% 9.43% 8.08% 11.71% 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semitrailers 
0.77 8.80% 8.31% 7.23% 9.42% 
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 
1.24 13.03% 5.25% 5.64% 11.98% 
Manufacture of furniture 1.11 11.86% 9.33% 8.26% 11.04% 
Other manufacturing 0.76 8.71% 8.94% 7.25% 9.29% 
Source: Our processing over AIDA, Ibbotson and Teofilo Intato Foundation 
database 
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Table 2 Beta, cost of capital (k), operating returns (ROI) and risks (std. deviation of ROI) 
(continued) 
Industry (translation of the original 
Italian name) Beta 
Cost of 
capital 
Average 
ROI 
Median 
ROI 
Standard 
deviation 
of ROI 
Building societies 0.59 7.18% 7.13% 6.61% 10.42% 
Trade, maintenance and repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
0.81 9.16% 9.43% 7.63% 11.78% 
Commerce wholesale and 
commission trade, motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
0.72 8.35% 7.63% 6.84% 13.05% 
Retail (excluding motor vehicles 
and motorcycles), repair of 
personal and household goods land 
transportation, pipeline transport, 
storage and auxiliary transport 
activities 
0.92 10.15% 6.40% 6.70% 11.58% 
Hotels and restaurants activities 1.62 16.45% 4.40% 3.11% 19.90% 
Computer and related activities 0.96 10.51% 16.45% 12.53% 18.59% 
Real estate 0.74 8.53% 5.37% 3.99% 9.49% 
Professional services 0.92 10.15% 12.62% 8.81% 18.57% 
Recreational cultural and sports 1.10 11.77% 4.00% 5.36% 18.04% 
 1.00 10.87% 8.45% 7.18% 12.16 
Source: Our processing over AIDA, Ibbotson and Teofilo Intato Foundation 
database 
For each industry, the cost of capital has been computed as the book-return threshold 
based on standard CAPM approach. Computations are based on industry betas extracted 
from Ibbostson the Cost of Capital Database. Raw data were suitably adjusted to their 
applicability to the Italian context according to the differential systematic risk between 
the US and Italian markets. 
Moreover, mean and median values of the return on investment (ROI) along with  
the associated standard deviation are reported. The gap between the mean and median can 
be an interesting proxy of the existence of companies called ‘best performers’ that  
should include those companies which are both competitive (i.e., goodwill based) and 
expertise-skilled (i.e., competence value backed). These most virtuous businesses are 
attracting our higher interest to make subsequent investigations, assuming they are to be 
found to be the most competent ones.  
Based on the above illustrated algorithms the T-ratio can be computed for the entire 
TV-area. We move from standard estimation of the cost of capital of our entire sample. 
This allows us to have the market shortfall data as in equation (9bis) that coincides with 
the district one for equation (10). 
Our basic hypothesis is that the average systematic risk of the TV-district equals the 
Italian one so that the TV’s beta equals 1.00. The equity risk premium was considered at 
9%, higher than the long-term-average Italian level (5.5–6.0%, according to the surveys 
by Fernandez et al., 2011). This choice is consequence of the GDP fluctuations, as 
prescript in Mehra-Prescott’s model (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) and of the illiquidity risk 
for unlisted companies. 
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The cost of capital (k) of TV-companies is fixed at10.87%  
1.87% (9.00%)1k = +  
Being: 1.87% is the risk-free rate (benchmark Italian treasury bond, BTP) at the time of 
computation (February 2011) 
Long term estimation of the Italian stock market indicates 18% as the standard 
deviation of price return on a yearly base. We fixed a confidence level at 10% which 
means risk tolerance higher than the one underlying value-at-risk Basel standards 
(confidence level at 1%), but it is consistent with average relative risk aversion  
(4.00–6.00 according to Bodie et al., 2014) and the correction required for illiquid Italian 
SMEs. In any event, you must remember that this choice should not have an impact over 
average results affordability according to Lintner’s approach (i.e., the single level of risk 
aversion is relevant for the specific investor’s investment policy). We can compute the 
shortfall level for the equity risk premium at 10% confidence as to determine a market 
maximum tolerated loss, m – SHF as in equation (9bis): 
1.87% 9.00% 1.282 18.00%) 1 12.21%m SHF− = + − × × = −  
According to figures in Table 2, the average operating book return for TV-companies is 
8.45%, while its standard deviation of the distribution is 12.16% (see last line in the 
table). A correction of the standard deviation has to be made according to the skewness of 
the distribution, mainly due to different expected growth ratio of the corporation. The 
corrected figure is 20.66%. 
Given the market SHF-level and the stated overlap with the others stated in  
equation (10), the threshold rate of return (k* = 14.28%) for competence value estimation 
is found using equation (9bis). 
* 12.21% 1.282 20.66% 14.28%k = − + × =  
The same computation can be repeated for any industry in order to identify specific k* 
levels4. 
The corporate performance is good if and only if the total return rate from the 
company (i.e., the sum of the numerators in equation (2bis) and (2ter)) is greater than 
(equals to), the resulting k* figure. 
* * ( )( )
(1 )t
p x ck r r x
k
+≤ = − + +  (14) 
According to equations (11), (12) and (13), the existence of competence value can be 
supposed if you have a positive residual subtracting the current corporate return (i.e.,  
[r – x], if any ‘x’) from r*. 
* *r k−  (15) 
Accordingly, you may have four qualities of corporate performance: 
1 competitive-companies with high returns (r > k) but without long term skill tillage 
that might affect the persistence of the corporate performance [unsatisfied condition 
(14)] 
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2 competence-based-enterprises with high competence value [satisfied condition (14)] 
but poor short term performance (i.e., [r – x] < k) 
3 vulnerable-firms which destroy value (r < k) but have positive returns, higher than 
the cost of debt capital only (r > i > 0) 
4 excellent-firms with contribution to the positive gap between mean and median data 
of the sample because have both goodwill and competence [r > k and condition (14) 
satisfied]. 
This is the clusters breakdown for the entire TV-area: 
1 competitive (value-creating) companies 
• frequency: 42.11% of the companies included in the sample meet this condition 
• current Q-ratio: 1.6049 (the cluster average, computed as ri/k) 
• 0.7773 is average Q-ratio of the TV-sample since less than 50% are competitive 
firms 
2 competence-based enterprises 
• frequency: 31.58% of the companies included in the sample meet this condition 
• potential Q-ratio: 8.8990 at the e-completing phase, computed as [(r + c)/k] 
• current T-ratio: 1.2818 [i.e., proxy estimation of W2/BV based on equation (13)] 
3 vulnerable firms (surviving but value-destroyer companies) 
• frequency: 20.44% of the companies included in the sample meet this condition 
• current Q-ratio: 0.1293 
4 excellent firms (having jointly Q and T >1) 
• frequency: 9.56% of the companies included in the sample meet this condition. 
Estimates for any specific industry are reported in Table 3. Some key points emerge in 
spite of these comprehensive results of the entire TV area: 
1 The economic incentive to sustain competence value is dramatically high even in the 
case of extension of several years of the maturity of the e-pullulating phase. An 
estimate of the maximum required time-length to capitalise the current 1.60 Q-ratio 
of the competitive companies to the potential 8.90 Q-ratio embedded in the skilled 
firms is 13 years (12.83) if computed according to the 14.28% rate of return. Of 
course, the probability of success (p) may even affect the required time length; the 
higher is p, the lower the break-even-t must be. at 30% probability (the typical 
probability success ratio of venture) the duration time is reduced to four years (4.40). 
2 Competitive corporations (42.11%) do not overlap to entrepreneurial business 
(31.58%), even in the very competitive TV-district. Only 9.56% of companies  
can be included in excellent-firms cluster. This means that 32.55% corporations 
(42.11%–9.56%) are competitive now but do not seem to have long term capability 
to perpetuate their competitiveness. On the opposite side, 22.02% (31.58%–9.56%) 
of corporations are competence-based without enough current book returns (maybe 
they are e-seed). 
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3 Out effect generated by the funding activity of vulnerable firms. Capital flows 
diversion from the 22.02% competence-based companies missing short-term returns 
immediately to the 20.44% vulnerable firms emerges clearly according to the 
empirical evidence of T-ratio and Q-ratio of the two clusters. Being funded at 
present, we can suppose that such vulnerable companies showed good Q-ratio 
standing (i.e., were Basel compliant) at the moment of capital allowance from the 
banking system, but no controls over the persistency of returns were done as implied 
in standard financial analysis. 
Considering the above depicted role of debt capital in competence value emersion and in 
SME funding, we conclude that misallocation in banking capital could be reduce by 
competence value detection, thus removing a real obstacle to complete the 
entrepreneurial cycle of the corporation (i.e., the long term economic growth) of the 
entire TV area. On average, the missing value is about 51% (i.e., 1.28–0.77) of total book 
values. Should the entrepreneurs be able to complete all the steps of their entrepreneurial 
cycle, the leverage ratio of these undercapitalised Italian companies would drop 
dramatically. 
Detailed computation at industry level gives further insight. The results clearly reflect 
how the convergence between the two indicators is never reached. On average, however, 
one can observe Intato-T-ratio values higher than those of Tobin-Q-ratio. This suggests 
that not so many business have the capacity to transform the self-competence value in 
goodwill, meaning that entrepreneurship is not so widely diffused. At the same time, the 
gap between T-ratio and Q-ratio depicts the opportunity cost of bad practices in credit 
allowances by Italian banks even in a strongly competitive area such as the TV-district. 
Moreover, standard Basel methods for credit allowances refer to Q-ratios, thus they 
suggest to invest more in apparently competitive industries and crunch credits to those 
having higher opportunities (i.e., wider T-Q spreads). 
Table 3 depicts more detailed results of Q and T estimates for different industries. As 
a general remark, it clearly emerges that very few industries have similar numeric values 
of T and Q. This evidence let us conclude that the capital allocation in the TV area is 
missing selectivity. But this is quite an obvious lemma of the use of bulk analytical tools, 
since their aim is to revert anything to the means instead of exploiting exceptions (both 
negative and positive, of course!). 
Table 3 Tobin-Q-ratio and Intato-T-ratio found in industries 
Industry (translation of the original Italian name) Q-ratio T-ratio 
Agriculture and hunting services, forestry 0.4382 1.3566 
Food and drink 1.2410 1.2299 
Manufacture of textiles 0.4131 1.1274 
Manufacture of clothing, dyeing, tanning fur 0.8605 1.3579 
Manufacture of leather goods made of wood, cork, straw 0.5577 1.2288 
Manufacture of wood, cork, straw 0.5346 1.0293 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.6065 0.9537 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.9120 1.1209 
Source: Our processing of data from the above data sources and algorithms 
from Teofilo Intato Foundation 
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Table 3 Tobin-Q-ratio and Intato-T-ratio found in industries (continued) 
Industry (translation of the original Italian name) Q-ratio T-ratio 
Manufacture of chemicals and artificial synthetic fibres and 1.5666 1.3534 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.8177 1.2594 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral processing 0.5123 1.3472 
Metallurgy – manufacture and processing of metal products 
except machinery and equipment 
0.9777 1.2198 
Manufacture of computers and electronic and optical products, 
electrical appliances, etc. 
0.6858 1.0578 
Manufacture of electrical and non-electric domestic appliances 0.8497 0.9332 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec 0.7140 1.2818 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers 0.9439 1.2593 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.4026 0.8536 
Manufacture of furniture 0.7867 1.2205 
Other manufacturing 1.0267 1.3729 
Building societies 0.9928 1.2014 
Trade, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1.0295 1.3755 
Commerce wholesale and commission trade, motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.9132 1.2593 
Retail (excluding motor vehicles and motorcycles), repair of 
personal and household goods land transportation, pipeline 
transport, storage and auxiliary transport activities 
0.6306 0.8767 
Hotels and restaurants activities 0.2677 1.2891 
Computer and related activities 1.5651 1.4825 
Real estate 0.6301 1.4380 
Professional services 1.2434 1.5666 
Recreational cultural and sports 0.3396 N.A. 
Treviso’s District as a total 0.7773 1.2818 
Source: Our processing of data from the above data sources and algorithms 
from Teofilo Intato Foundation 
Analysis of the data in Table 4 clearly confirms that there is no perfect overlap between 
competitive and skilled firms, implying that even the frequency of Q-ratio > 1 and the  
T-ratio > 1 does not converge. This is particularly consistent with the hypothesis of 
incomplete markets, but – at the same time – is proof that entrepreneurial value discovery 
require industries to be analysed more carefully using non-obvious methods. This is 
exactly the opposite of Basel approaches that prefers to adopt standard bulk techniques in 
financial analysis in search of industries with only high level of (short term) goodwill 
instead than (long term) competence value emersion. This approach avoids considering 
that in the long run the competition only tends to reduce operating margins without 
opportunity for their recovery, as given by competence emersion. According to these 
standard approaches, capital flows have lower processing costs but prefer pro-cyclical 
allocation to reduce opportunities. 
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Table 4 Frequency of competitive firms and entrepreneurial firms 
Industry (translation of the original Italian name) Frequency of Q > 1 firms 
Frequency of 
T > 1 firms 
Agriculture and hunting services, forestry 32.92% 19.72% 
Food and drink 56.68% 18.04% 
Manufacture of textiles 24.16% 36.26% 
Manufacture of clothing, dyeing, tanning fur 45.40% 36.51% 
Manufacture of leather goods made of wood, cork, straw 27.51% 56.23% 
Manufacture of wood, cork, straw 28.93% 31.57% 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 28.97% 42.88% 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 46.43% 37.05% 
Manufacture of chemicals and artificial synthetic fibres and 63.84% 25.93% 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 43.37% 32.67% 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral processing 24.96% 57.58% 
Metallurgy – manufacture and processing of metal products 
except machinery and equipment 
49.14% 39.23% 
Manufacture of computers and electronic and optical products, 
electrical appliances, etc. 
37.26% 30.06% 
Manufacture of electrical and non-electric domestic appliances 46.48% 6.98% 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec 37.35% 48.55% 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semitrailers 47.91% 34.61% 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 25.79% 15.43% 
Manufacture of furniture 40.94% 42.87% 
Other manufacturing 51.00% 43.43% 
Building societies 49.80% 14.13% 
Trade, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 50.92% 32.06% 
Commerce wholesale and commission trade, motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
47.79% 13.98% 
Retail (excluding motor vehicles and motorcycles), repair of 
personal and household goods land transportation, pipeline 
transport, storage and auxiliary transport activities 
37.30% 12.04% 
Hotels and restaurants activities 27.25% 29.47% 
Computer and related activities 62.53% 32.91% 
Real estate 36.98% 33.04% 
Professional services 55.29% 30.41% 
Recreational cultural and sports 33.33% N.A. 
Treviso’s District as a total 42.11% 31.58% 
Source: Our processing of data from the above data sources and algorithms 
from Teofilo Intato Foundation 
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5 Concluding remarks 
A possible methodology of competence value estimation has been presented supposing 
an incomplete financial market context. Such a method is based on a three stage life cycle 
of entrepreneurial behaviour. The method clearly shows strong differences between 
goodwill generation and competence widespread. 
High value-to-price ratios of incomplete financial markets are terrific economic 
incentives to let value emerge. The progressive marketability of competence value could 
contribute more effectively to the financing of the process of accumulation of skills. 
Hence, they should be a good challenge for entrepreneurs to reap the financial resources 
they require. But, at the same time, their price-discovery mechanisms are all biased by 
the absence of pairing groups for value benchmarking, an exasperating constraint for 
entrepreneurial finance practices. This is exactly why standard financial analysis systems 
fails to measure the competence value, thus avoiding to consider it in the capital 
allowances decisions of the intermediaries. Currently, neither the book values nor the 
market values can appreciate them: the former detects the capital-quotas only and the 
latter is usually missed due to market incompleteness. Contrarian to the standard ‘Basel’ 
approaches for SMEs financing, debt could be superior in the phase of competence 
spreading: debt can contribute to complete financial markets by riding the competence 
value. 
Debt funding with strong covenants can resolve agency problems which arise from 
the abandonment option that the entrepreneur may always exercise. The return-to-risk 
ratio of a company consequently drops. However, these empirical data from the Treviso’s 
District suggest some final considerations: 
1 Incentives in the traditional industries that do not support the transformation of skills 
into market value are likely to support business initiatives that generate excess 
returns in the short term, but which are unable to sustain long term performance. 
This could contribute to explain the lower growth ratio of Italian SMEs (and 
economics). 
2 The application of criteria for determining the credit allowances based only on 
return-to-risk compatible with the neo-classical theory of finance is likely to 
encourage the formation of values that might emphasise long-term instability of the 
system because (debt) capital flow is given when competitive factor is on the top. 
3 It remains an open question as to whether having several financial solutions could 
resolve the emergence of higher potential values. 
This will be the topic of our future investigations. At present we can state that the gap 
between the indicators and economic space has not yet filled in terms of selectivity in its 
financing. This gap may dramatically increase in case of application of Basel-3 
agreement without considering value discovery opportunities given by entrepreneurial 
finance. This gap can only be resolved with the formation of qualified professionals 
(especially in corporate finance) equipped with reliable tools such as the ones presented 
here. This is a challenge for both academics and practitioners. The Treviso’s experience 
can be an example! 
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Notes 
1 Still a steady state company is supposed, to make easier to understand and to continue the 
previous exposition. 
2 Here further the application of the original Intato-method is transparently illustrated as it was 
developed at industry-level, but any responsibility for unclearness is due to the author. We 
thank the trustees of the foundation to allow us of the full use of industry-level formulas in this 
paper. 
3 This is indeed the inner difference in the application of the method at industry level for an  
ex-post verification. In ex-ante esteem you can anyway consider the mean reversion of 
corporate that can be useful even to apply the method at corporate level. 
4 Transforming the market shortfall (–12.21%) into an threshold return (+14.28%) is useful for 
the application of the formula at industry level. At corporate level, practice suggests to use the 
shortfall, being easier to estimate the competence value through the analysis of the true 
possibility of the company to generate returns higher than market shortfall (–12.21%) with a 
90% confidence. This being the case, the persistency of returns is supposed. 
